The Rise and Ruse of Administrative Law and Scholarship by Hutchinson, Allan C.
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship
1985
The Rise and Ruse of Administrative Law and
Scholarship
Allan C. Hutchinson
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, ahutchinson@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Hutchinson, Allan C. "The Rise and Ruse of Administrative Law and Scholarship." The Modern Law Review 48.3 (1985): 293-324.
 THE RISE AND RUSE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
AND SCHOLARSHIP 
 
 
FOR many members of the legal community, the signal achievement of the 
past two decades has been the rise of administrative law. The 1964 
decision of Ridge v. Baldwin 1 has been hailed as a "milestone in the 
history of judicial pronouncements" 2 and the birthdate of the revival of 
administrative law in England.3 Roused from their slumbers, the judicial 
Rip Van Winkles have taken the State to task and imposed a strenuous 
regime of administrative legality. In the slipstream of this judicial 
activity, there has been a corresponding surge of academic interest and 
output. While other regions of the common law atrophy and die,4 
administrative law and scholarship is pronounced healthy and thriving. 
After 21 years, administrative law has come of age; the best is yet to 
come. Against such an exciting and optimistic backdrop, this article seeks 
to present a more realistic scenario, presently depressing but potentially 
exciting. It argues that the doctrine of judicial review of administrative 
action is quantitatively insignificant and qualitatively indeterminate. As 
such, this article unashamedly picks up the gauntlet thrown down by 
Patrick McAuslan and accepts his challenge to carry out an ideological 
analysis of the current system and to experiment with new theories of 
administrative law.5 It is a self-conscious attempt "to live dangerously, 
to chance [my] arm and philosophise. "6 
The rise of administrative law and scholarship is a ruse. For all the 
ballyhoo, the impact of the law on the administrative process is marginal. 
The rhetoric is far removed from the reality. The importance of 
administrative law lies in its ideological rather than its instrumental function. 
Administrative law and scholarship facilitate and legitimate administrative 
power whose exercise and abuse they exist to constrain and eradicate.7 In so 
far as the supposed need and justification for judicial review is premised on 
democratic inertia or indifference and legislative impotence or overwork, 
attention must switch to these institutional evils. The reform and revitalisation 
of the democratic organs of government must be adopted and pursued. An 
ounce of democratic prevention is better than a pound of judicial cure. The 
vast institutional and intellectual resources invested in administrative law and 
scholarship must be redeployed. 
Of course, to criticise administrative law and to advocate the 
abolition of judicial review is not to approve of maladministration. As 
presently constituted, administrative agencies and tribunals are as 
undemocratic as the courts. Yet, a commitment to criticism represents 
a constructive step towards an effective control of the administrative 
process. The courts are constitutionally and democratically incapable 
of acting as a "bridle for [the administrative] Leviathan."8 Indeed, "the 
proclaimed revival of judicial review 
. . . is really wishful thinking by academic commentators and judges. "9 Also, 
a troubling paradox lies at the heart of this resurgent activity. The aim and 
rationale of judicial intervention in the administrative process is to avoid a 
monopoly of power with its tendency to corrupt and to curtail individual 
 freedom. Yet, in so doing, the judges are open to the charge that this 
reinforces their own monopolistic position and power. 
Sadly, as so often, legal academics have allowed themselves, unwittingly 
or otherwise, to be used as ideological apologists, · identifying political 
impartiality and conceptual coherence in the jumble of decisions. They 
recognise an appropriate and realisable role for the courts in supervising 
the legality of administrative acts, while leaving their substantive merits 
to political modes of control.10 Yet, there is developing a powerful critique 
of this traditional scholarship. 11 In this sense, the present article does_ 
not make any claims to originality or novelty. However, it does adopt a 
very different methodology which offers a more structured, sustained and 
cogent account of the workings of administrative law and the legal 
process generally. Whereas other critics retain a lingering faith in the 
potential efficacy of judicial review, suitably reformed and reconstituted, 
this article suggests that the retention of any form of judicial review 
cannot be justified if our democratic commitments and ambitions are 
taken seriously. 
It is the burden of this article to substantiate these claims which will 
appear extravagant, if not actually offensive, to many. It is a modest 
essay in Critical Legal Scholarship. 12 It will suggest the new democratic 
paths to be explored, if the administrative process is to serve the 
genuine interests of the governed. The article is divided into four 
sections. First, the theoretical foundations of the critique will be 
sketched and the problematic relation between the individual and the 
State introduced. Secondly, an analysis of the courts' handling of 
administrative disputes is offered. This section forms the bulk of the 
paper and touches upon different aspects of the judicial process, 
including its doctrinal indeterminacy and its practical marginality. 
Although far from exclusive, there is a strong focus on the saga of the 
G.L.C.'s "Fares Fair" scheme. Thirdly, a critical survey of the 
burgeoning scholarly literature is presented which focuses upon its 
theoretical reductionism and its constructivist inadequacies. Finally, some 
positive and tentative proposals for reform are put forward. 
 
I. LAW, STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL: THE CONTRADICTION OF LEGAL 
DOCTRINE 
 
A. A Critical Prolegomena 
In all its guises, Western thought has been devoted to containing the 
corrosive and subversive messages of social contradiction and historical 
contingency. Political and legal theory has sought to deny two 
fundamental and related truths. First, there is no natural or necessary 
form of social life. Existing social arrangements can lay no claim to 
objective or universal validity. They represent nothing more than 
temporary and historical solutions to the problems of human 
interaction. There is no one true, enduring and ahistorical form of 
 social existence. Secondly, this historical contingency feeds upon the 
contradiction in social life between the individual and the community. 13 
Both individualists and communitarians insist that there exists a mere 
conflict which can be rationally resolved and the resulting solution be 
possessed of objective moral force. Yet, there is actually a 
contradiction between individual choice and communal control. They 
are antithetical concepts and defy compromise or mediation. 
Interaction with others is both necessary to and incompatible with 
freedom. Communal control protects and facilitates individual freedom 
as well as threatening to overwhelm it. In crude terms, whereas 
communitarianism sacrifices the individual to the collective will, 
liberalism worships the individual at the expense of the communal 
good. An individual is more than an automatic functionary of some 
holistic society or an obsessive egoist in an alienated world. 
The universe of legal discourse is profoundly and complexly implicated in 
this political struggle. The enterprise of adjudication and legal scholarship 
serves to clothe social arrangements with the essential garments of 
legitimacy. Judges and scholars contribute to the prevailing ideology or 
mind-set which insists that the present organisation of society is not only 
rational and just, but necessary and inevitable. Moreover, the construction of 
elaborate schemes of legal rights and entitlements from available legal 
materials helps to justify  the  status quo and erect formidable  barriers  to 
social change. Although hierarchy and domination are rife within society, the 
ideal of governance according to the rule of law masks these offensive 
facts. By pretending that legal outcomes are the product of  apolitical  and 
neutral  modes of  argument  rather  than  the imposed preferences of an 
arbitrary hierarchy, the rule of law contributes to the transformation of an 
illegitimate world of social disorder into a legitimate world of legal right. 
Legal thought operates as an intellectual tool for the suppression of historical 
contingency and the denial of social contradiction. It helps to obscure the 
fundamental truth that everything is in the irresistible process of becoming and 
not being. Modern legal thought offers itself as a timeless way of 
understanding and conquering the world. Nevertheless, the universe of legal 
discourse does not provide a true mirror-image of the socio-political culture. 
There is an element of distortion. In Kuhnian terms, the proliferation of 
"anomalies" makes untenable the establishment and defence of a crude and 
directcausal nexus between the material conditions of social life and its 
legal superstructure. 14 While the extant legal materials are constitutive of a 
social system and sustain in part the existing hierarchy, it is fanciful to suggest 
that a "capitalistic" social system, able to weather  the storms of  welfare  
statism  and industrial nationalisation, necessitates a particular regime of legal 
rules. 15 Consequently, the law is not simply an institutional instrument at the 
disposal of the ruling hierarchy. It possesses some "relative autonomy."  The 
historical  consciousness  reigns,  but  does not 
 
 
govern absolutely. The need for legitimation is so strong that it may 
best serve the dominant groups in society to encourage or permit 
some decisions which benefit the dominated. As E. P. Thompson 
 concludes: 
"The rhetoric and the rules of a society are something a great deal 
more than sham. In the same moment they may modify, in 
profound ways, the behaviour of the powerful, and mystify the 
powerless. They may disguise the true realities of power, but, at 
the same time, they may curb that power and check its 
intrusions."16 
The law is like a dog on a long leash. Although it will ultimately 
follow the lead of its political master, it has considerable range of 
movement. It can wander from the chosen path and cause 
considerable damage and frustration. 
Accordingly, the outcome of struggles within the legal arena are not 
dictated solely by the whims of the dominant hierarchy. Legal doctrine 
does not conform to any simple logic and is unified only by its 
enduring indeterminacy; there exists "a permanent disequilibrium of 
doctrine."17 With imagination and industry, legal materials can be 
organised so as to support radically inconsistent positions. Indeed, 
most modern legal theorists have conceded that "law . . . is deeply and 
thoroughly political," but they contrive to insist that it is "not a 
matter of personal or partisan politics. "18 Abandoning the high 
ground of formalism, they search for a "background theory" which 
shows the legal data in their best light as precepts of political morality. 
Yet the very diversity of theories offered undermines the enterprise. 
In so far as it is possible to defend a variety of plausible theories, 
no one proposal can lay claim to exclusivity or universality. 19 
Meaningful interpretation is only possible where there already exists a 
commitment to a shared set · of values. However, as in the political 
domain, the legal territory is a focus of conflict. There is a 
pervasive matrix of contradictory forces which prevents the 
establishment of a sufficiently full tradition of shared understandings. 
The indeterminacy of legal doctrine finds its energy and power in 
the antithetical modalities of individual and community. This deep 
logic of contradiction sustains and ensures an inescapable scheme of 
doctrinal indeterminacy. Doctrine can be consistently converted into 
its own opposite self-image. 
 
 
 
B. The Administrative State and its Citizens 
The courts are a venue for the unending struggle between the competing 
world visions. Although fundamentally contradictory, they are believed in 
and espoused at the same time. In mistakenly viewing these visions as 
capable of compromise or mediation, judges and lawyers are not active 
participants in some vast Machiavellian plot; they are conscientious players 
in an irresistible and endless game of social chess. The problem lies not so 
much in their self-imposed, although rarely realised, utopian ambition, but in 
the hopelessness of making anything more than intuitive, ad hoc guesses at 
 the desirability of any particular social arrangement. The judge and legal 
scholar cannot evade the role of social visionary. The dialectical tension 
between individualism and communitarianism generates competing legal 
principles that march in pairs throughout the law. While the doctrinal 
manifestations of one vision may temporarily gain the upper hand and 
whole areas of doctrine appear uncontroversial, the insoluble quality of the 
contradiction guarantees that renewed struggle is always close at hand. The 
alternate vision can be contained, but can never be obliterated. There is no 
logical or natural point at which one vision ends and the other begins. At 
every turn, choices must be made. 
The esoteric and convoluted nature of legal discourse is the direct 
consequence of the need to obscure this inescapable element of judicial 
choice. Rather than "arbitrate conflict through the impartial elaboration of a 
mechanical legal analytic,"20 the judge is a political and creative actor. To 
judge is to choose. The evolution of legal doctrine comprises an endless series 
of fragile and makeshift compromises between contradictory ideals. 
Importantly, there is no meta-theory available for determinate guidance. 
Legal discourse is nothing more than a stylised version of political 
discourse. Legal materials comprise a repository of technical resources by 
which to naturalise and universalise the temporary structures that interrupt the 
flow of social history. Yet, the analysis is not nihilistic. It treats legal 
doctrine seriously. Law is not a jumble of unintelligible materials, but is 
shaped by the deep and contradictory structure that informs contemporary 
hierarchical society. The vitality and history of the common law can be 
traced to the continuous oscillation between competing social visions. This 
dialectical drama is most openly played out in the arena of administrative 
law where social concerns and individual interests collide head-on. As one 
prominent commentator notes, the challenge is "to balance action taken on 
behalf of the public at large against the interests of a single individual whose 
rights . . . may be affected by the exercise of the public power. "21 
As abstract and ahistorical visions, individualism and communitarianism 
represent highly stylised ends of an ideological spectrum. 
Individualism represents a world consisting of independent and self-
sufficient persons who confidently draw up and robustly pursue their own 
life-plans. Values and tastes are relative and subjective; individuals seek 
to maximise their own preferences. The legal system supports such a 
regime by protecting private property, enforcing bargains and creating 
autonomous spheres of action.22 At the other extreme, communitarianism 
comprises a world made up of interdependent and co-operating persons. 
Recognising the vulnerability of individuals, it encourages greater 
solidarity and altruism. There exists a central belief in the possibility of 
communal values and the capacity to know a common good that 
cannot be known alone. The legal system contributes to such a regime 
by dismantling private property, regulating the distribution of resources 
and providing for interactive projects.23 However, each vision represents 
only a partial and incomplete depiction of social life and its possibilities. 
Neither is reliable or realisable as an exclusive basis for social 
 organisation. Individualism must depend upon some "nightwatchman 
State" to guarantee the conditions for effective individual achievement. 
Similarly, communitarianism must acknowledge the claims of individuals 
to their own tastes and preferences. Both atomism and holism are 
unworkable and indefensible. However, once the viability of the spectral 
extremes is denied, the slide into doctrinal indeterminacy is ensured. 
An actual example will clarify this argument. A persistent problem 
for administrative lawyers is to determine the circumstances in which an 
individual is entitled to an administrative hearing. Traditional legal 
scholars are obliged by their own jurisprudential premises24 to claim 
that there is some neutral calculus which generates a coherent and 
consistent doctrine of "hearings." But the actual practice repudiates the 
theory.25  In extreme terms, there exists a stark choice between "no 
hearing" and a "full hearing." These options crudely reproduce the basic 
contradiction. 26 A "no hearing" doctrine would pull towards 
communitarianism with its implicit assumptions that the public good 
outweighs individual interests and that decisions are best made in 
terms of community solidarity. A "full hearing" doctrine, while 
accepting that the public good might be preferred over individual 
rights, maintains that individuals ought to be given the fullest 
opportunity to defend and argue their own individual claims. In so far 
as traditional legal thought is premised on the necessary and realisable 
reconciliation of the competing interests of individuals and 
community, it would be the negation of its very raison d'etre to opt 
completely for either extreme. Doctrine vacillates. Neither legal 
logicians nor policy analysts can provide objective guidance as to 
where doctrine ought to position itself along the continuum. 
While the dominant principle in contemporary doctrine favours a "full 
hearing,"27 there exists a counter-principle which concedes that "no hearing" 
is justified in certain circumstances. 28 However, once a valid communitarian 
component is admitted, it must be arbitrarily held in check or else it will 
consume the whole doctrine. At any time, the discrete legal pieces could be 
rearranged into a completely different doctrinal jigsaw. Determinacy is 
contrived, superficial and ephemeral. The still waters of legal doctrine run 
deep and dangerous. The apparent calm is continuously being disturbed. So 
much so that surface determinacy must give way to deep indeterminacy. 
Ever present, the doctrinal struggle most clearly manifests itself in "instances 
of exemplary difficulty"29 ; cases where the tension between contradictory 
forces and its previous suppression become so volatile that the tenuous 
coherence of doctrine is shattered. Along with a broader systemic analysis, 
these recalcitrant instances will comprise the critical focus of the paper. 
 
C. Substance and Symbol 
It is often said that Britain has become a socialist state. Indeed, as early as 
1905, Dicey opined that the years from 1865 to 1900 were a "period of 
collectivism."30 While it is true that Britain has added the trappings of a 
 welfare state, society remains founded upon the individualistic 
institutions of private property and private enterprise. Notwithstanding 
the demise of laissez-faire capitalism, British society is dominated by 
the commitment to industrial profitability. 31 There is a large public 
sector, subject to governmental regulation, but the vast amount of 
wealth and power is still wielded by private interests. In retrospect, the 
move from a market economy toward a more mixed economy occurred 
to avert crisis and to enable the continued expansion of private capital 
accumulation.32 The governmental apparatus has fallen captive to 
large-scale business corporations which are, in turn, controlled by a 
small coterie of privileged individuals. The creation of a large public 
sector has facilitated the concentration of economic power as much as 
its redistribution. While benefiting many, the welfare state has acted as 
a prop for beleaguered private centres of economic and political 
domination. Any loss in autonomy has been adequately compensated for 
by greater material gains. Moreover, the expansion of the regulatory 
state has served to divert attention away from the private sector. It has 
enabled "the citadels of private power [to remain] insulated from the 
risks of party-political conflict. "33 
Although Parliament has been the builder of the regulatory state, the 
Executive has been the architect. Moreover, Parliament has sub-
contracted out most of the work. There exists a mammoth administrative 
apparatus to implement, monitor and enforce the legion activities of 
government. Originally a creature of legislative enactment, the 
administrative process has taken on an institutional existence of its own. 
This development has profoundly affected the balance and allocation of 
power within the British system of governance. Agencies and tribunals 
manage the nation's business in accordance with governmental 
policies, conceived by the Executive and rubber-stamped by an 
obedient Parliament. Few aspects of people's lives from cradle to coffin 
are unaffected by the state. Ostensibly in the public good, the state 
acts as protector, dispenser of social services, industrial manager, 
economic controller and arbitrator.34 Throughout the century, there has 
been a marked shift in the governmental centre of gravity. Although 
private interest remains the life force, the public process of 
administration has become "the pulse of the modern legal order."35 
Administrators not only make far more law than legislators, but they 
resolve far more disputes than judges. 
The legal process has played a major role in distorting this reality. 
There is a marked discrepancy between the actual practice of the 
administrative process and the picture painted of it by legal doctrine. 
This ideological function of the law is of paramount importance.36 
Also, in responding to the establishment of the administrative process 
as the fulcrum of modern governmental power, the courts have been 
 dually motivated. First, they have sought to reassert their waning 
institutional power and to confirm their essential relevance to the control 
of illegitimate power. Some involvement with the burgeoning 
administrative activities of the state seemed appropriate. However, 
secondly, they have been very concerned to justify their own exercise 
of power and to adopt a stance that befits their perceived constitutional 
responsibilities and powers. Their achievement has been mixed. As an 
ideological exercise, they have been successful in persuading people of 
their constitutional propriety and effectiveness. As a matter of practical 
effect, they have been less successful. Although the history and 
development of judicial review is fascinating reading,37 its present status 
and ambit that is more important. A doctrinal model of the objectives 
and limits of judicial review can be constructed from recent judicial 
statements.38 It must be emphasised that this model is not intended to be 
an account of what the courts do, but only of what they say they do. 
 
D. The Rhetoric of Judicial Review 
The doctrinal model of judicial review centres upon two important 
issues; the appropriate division and exercise of governmental power. 
Not surprisingly, the dominance of the individualistic vision is marked. 
Within society, people are assumed to be constantly at odds and band 
together to form a government. Compromise is considered preferable 
to the oppressive uncertainty of unrestrained struggle. The limited duty 
of the government is to enact a body of norms through which to regulate 
the social interaction of its atomistic citizens. To enforce, interpret and 
apply these norms, a judicial branch of government must be 
established. 39 However, problems of democratic legitimacy arise. This 
constitutional dilemma of decision-making is overcome by resort to the 
basic dichotomy between values and facts. Whereas values are 
considered personal, subjective and arbitrary, facts are taken to be 
homogenous, objective and orderly. The legislature is presumed to 
operate in the unstable realm of values and has the responsibility to 
enact laws designed to achieve substantively just compromise between 
competing values. However, once its decisions are translated into a set 
of rules, there is a clear shift from the realm of values to the domain 
of facts. The Machiavellian world is left behind and the constitutional 
Rubicon is crossed. Expressed as a rule, the legislative compromise of 
values is converted into fact and becomes amenable to scientific 
interpretation and application; "[t]he sovereignty of Parliament runs in 
tandem with the rule of objective law."40 
In this way, the fundamental democratic demands of popular 
consensus, as sought in the legislative process, and rationality, as 
embodied in the judicial process, are claimed to be satisfied. Further, 
arguments of law and morality are rendered mutually exclusive. 
 Through the neutral application of rules, the judges are insulated from 
political controversy.41 The compulsion to reason within a closed system 
of premises guarantees the enduring integrity of the constitutional 
compact. Within this constitutional scenario, administrative agencies 
only exist as the "executory amanuenses of the legislative will."42 
However, overwhelmed and overcommitted, the legislature must 
delegate massive authority to avoid a total paralysis of government. 
Inevitably, this delegation becomes an abdication of power. 
Accordingly, the courts step in to take up the democratic slack. They 
perform a constraining function and act as the policing agents of the 
legislature.43 With suitable constitutional deference, judges resist the 
temptation to second-guess the exercise of administrative discretion.44 It 
is a matter of formal process and not substantive decision. The courts 
act as frontier guards between the spheres of state action and citizen 
,activity. Legislators are the cartographers and legislative enactments are 
the boundary markers. Indeed, the ambit, if not the source, of the 
judicial policing power is also conferred and confined by legislation. 
To guard against the temptation to establish themselves as 
independent power centres, judges claim to adjudicate disputes between 
the State and its citizens by the rigorous and faithful implementation of 
legislative intent. Neutrality and objectivity is preserved by casting 
statutory interpretation as an exercise in linguistic analysis. Judges 
search not for what the legislature 
intended, but the true meaning of the words used.45 The legislative 
expression of the political compromise is treated as a certain fact 
whose proper application can and must be determinatively effected 
through an impersonal and apolitical set of interpretive techniques. 
Furthermore, it is presumed that, unless Parliament states to the 
contrary, administrative discretion is subject to the existing common law 
rules. The essential quality of their involvement is neatly captured by 
Lawton L.J.: 
"In the United Kingdom . . . policy is determined by ministers within 
the legal framework set out by Parliament. Judges have nothing to do 
with either policy making or the carrying out of policy. Their 
function is to decide whether a minister has acted within the powers 
given him by statute or the common law. If he is declared by a 
court, after due process of law, to have acted outside his powers, 
he must stop doing what he has done until Parliament gives him 
the powers he wants. In a case such as this I regard myself as a 
referee. I can blow my judicial whistle when the ball goes out of 
play; but when the game restarts I must neither take part in it nor 
tell the players how to play. "46 
In this way, the judges claim to underwrite their constitutional power 
and transcend vulgar political debate and still make a valid contribution 
 to the continued efficacy of the basic compact between the State and its 
citizens. Importantly, they claim to do so within the bounds of 
constitutional propriety. Yet, the rhetoric of judicial review is not 
substantiated by the reality of performance. The judicial achievement 
falls hopelessly short of its ambition. Indeed, the ambition is futile. With 
the best will, the promise could not be performed. It is the burden of 
the next section to support these claims. 
 
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND THE COURTS 
 
A. The Politics of Judicial Policing 
In performing its self-acclaimed role as a constitutional police force, 
the judiciary promotes an image of impartial obedience and servitude, 
faithfully adopting a deferential posture to the will of Parliament. 
Indeed, the cornerstone of administrative law has been the notion of 
ultra vires. The judicial task is intended to exhaust itself in ensuring 
that the administrative process operates within the legislatively ordained 
parameters of permissible conduct. Although not the exclusive device of 
containment, administrative law is primarily a matter of statutory 
interpretation. Accordingly, this section will demonstrate that statutory 
interpretation is not a technical and objective activity, but is 
inescapably creative and political. Although this characteristic can be 
disguised or obscured, it can never be side-stepped or eradicated. 
Moreover, the indeterminacy of those politics will be constantly 
revealed. As an exhaustive account of the judicial handling of the 
administrative process is beyond this paper, a small number of discrete, 
but representative topics will be dealt with. 
Although the courts insist that statutory interpretation can be effected 
apolitically, they nonetheless claim that the power to interpret statutes 
is pivotal. It is the courts' construction of legislative words and not 
the words themselves that is law.47 Not only is the extent of that power 
extremely limited, but the claimed existence of such a power sits 
uneasily with their presentation of statutory interpretation as a technical 
exercise in linguistic analysis. Whichever one of the great triumvirate 
of approaches, "literal," "golden" or "mischief,"48 is used, the courts 
"are seeking not what Parliament meant but the true meaning of what 
they said."49 By drawing a marked distinction between the legislative 
and the interpretive function, the courts hope to legitimate their power. 
But this is little more than a constitutional pose. At a general level, it 
can be observed that words do not interpret themselves and that the 
analysis of language is not a value-free exercise. For instance, the 
courts' handling of so-called "gaps" in a statutory scheme is 
contradictory and inconsistent.50 Taking a strict stance, the court will 
treat the statutory text as exhaustive and strike out the claim as 
revealing no legal cause of action. In so doing, the court will have 
 flouted reality by acknowledging that it cannot generate a solution to 
the inevitable batch of "unforeseen" cases. Further, if a liberal stance 
is taken, the court will recognise the existence of a "gap" and seek to 
fill the legislative silence. To do this, the court will have to resort to 
considerations extraneous to the text of the statute. Moreover, the initial 
recognition of a gap is 
premised on the assumption that the statutory text is not an exhaustive 
expression of the sovereign will of Parliament. Adopting either a strict or 
liberal riosition, the traditional approach is incomplete and inconsistent. 
1
 
The recent fiasco over the Greater London Council's "Fares Fair" 
scheme emphasises the creative dimension of statutory interpretation.52 
Under the harsh glare of media-fuelled public interest, the rhetoric of 
judicial review was represented and indicted in microcosm. It was an 
ironic version of judicial trial by political ordeal. The facts are too 
notorious to warrant detailed repetition. After a successful election 
campaign, the Labour-controlled G.L.C. instructed the London Transport 
Executive (L.T.E.) to reduce bus and tube fares by 25 per cent. The 
cost was to be financed by a supplementary levy on the ratepayers. As 
a result of the new fares scheme, the Government reduced its block 
grant to the G.L.C. This effectively doubled the cost of the reduction 
in fares and a supplementary rate precept was issued to all 32 London 
boroughs. Bromley L.B.C. sought to quash the imposition of the 
supplementary rate and restrain the G.L.C. from continuing with the 
new fares scheme. Although the Divisional Court rejected Bromley 
L.B.C.'s application on the ground that the G.L.C.'s action lay at the 
margin of what is permissible, the Court of Appeal found for Bromley 
L.B.C. and held the precept to be null and void. In a unanimous 
decision, the House of Lords upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal. 
The thrust of the courts' decisions was that the Transport (London) Act 
1969 did not empower the G.L.C. to finance a reduction in fares by a 
supplementary precept. Although the G.L.C. had broad policy and 
grant-making power over the L.T.E., it was under a duty to promote the 
provision of integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities and 
services for Greater London. 
For the House of Lords, the central issue was legality: was the 
decision of the G.L.C. within the limited powers that the statute had 
conferred upon it? This question of ultra vires could be disposed of by 
ascertaining the "proper,"53 "true,"54 or "correct"55 meaning of 
"economic." Although the court conceded that the Act was drafted in 
"opaque and elliptical language," evidenced "a lack of clarity,"56 was 
"vague, possibly with design"57 and, in particular, that the term 
"economic" was "chameleon-like,"58 the Law Lords 
 
 
sought to attach a precise meaning to "economic." Moreover, the 
interpretative process was to be "looked at objectively."59 For instance, 
 Lords Wilberforce and Diplock recognised that the subsidisation of 
public transport from public funds and its treatment as a social service 
raised grave and important issues of transport policy, but remained 
adamant that it was "a matter of political contr?versJ; . . . ['Yhich the 
court] must scrupulously efrain .from entenng." In their own terms, the 
Law Lords were msuffic1ently scrupulous. To ignore the debate over 
whether transport is a social service supports the view that it is not a 
social service. Moreover, failure to inquire into Parliament's contribution 
to the debate casts an even greater air of unreality over the attempt at 
statuto1;?; interpretation. Although not conclusive of legislative intent, 
1 Richard Marsh, then Minister of Transport, in moving the second 
reading of the Bill, gave a strong indication of Parliament's stance on 
the G.L.C.'s policy and grant-making power: 
"This is very important, because if the Council wishes the 
executive to do something that will cause it to fall short of its 
financial targets, it will itself have to take financial responsibility for it. 
The Council might wish, for example, the executive to run a series 
of services at a loss for social or planning reasons. It might wish to 
keep fares down at a time when costs are rising and there is no 
scope for economies. It is free to do so. But 1t has to bear the 
cost."62 
Rather than face the issue of transport policy squarely and openly, the 
Law Lords decided that "the only safe course is to try to understand the 
contemporary language."63 In so doing, they concluded that the 
"economic" restraint on the G.L.C. meant that it must act in accordance 
with ordinary business principles; transport was to be run as a cost-
effective business enterprise.64 While transport, need not operate at a 
profit, it did demand that the 
G.L.C. must seek to avoid loss and, certainly, adopt a policy of loss-
making. Lord Scarman left no room for doubt when he said that the 
"reduction was adopted not because any higher fare level was 
impracticable but as an object of social and transport policy. It was not 
a reluctant yielding to economic necessity but a policy preference. In 
so doing, the G.L.C. abandoned business principles. That was . . . wrong 
in law."65 By placing such a limited definition on "economic," the 
House was not only delivering a slap in the face to local democracy, 
but was confirming a very clear vision of society. The decision 
represents a clear political preference in favour of the ethic of private 
enterprise over that of collective consumption. 66 Yet, for present 
purposes, the existence of that choice is more important than the 
nature of that choice. 
The meaning of "economic" is far from self-evident. Indeed, it is ludicrous 
to suggest that it has one "true" or "correct" meaning. There is a vast 
literature on the "economic" operation of public services and nationalised 
industries. Whether such organisations should seek to break even, 
 maximise profit, price discriminate, marginal cost price or the like is moot. 
At its broadest, "economic" can refer to any decision that concerns the 
distribution or allocation of resources. 67 Also, in a narrow sense, it can be 
argued that, as it is not politically or logistically feasible to charge private 
road users a realistic cost for the congestion they cause, subsidised 
public transport is the next best "economic" policy to reduce congestion 
and its costs.68 Also, the extent of the subsidisation by G.L.C. is very 
low when compared to the annual investment by other municipalities in 
their transportation network.69 Accordingly, the decision to construe 
"economic" as meaning "commercially viable" is by no means inevitable or 
rationally necessary. It represents a choice. It does not flow inextricably 
from the words of the statute, but demands a judicial interlocuter. The 
interpretative process is not mechanical or objective, but creative and 
relativistic. 
Before examining the determinants of that judicial choice, there is a 
more subtle and, in a sense, more profound objection to the practice of 
judicial review and statutory interpretation generally. Under the 
traditional model, individual interests and preferences are in constant flux. 
Therefore, parliamentary rule-making occurs under conditions of 
uncertainty; a statutory enactment is based on a series of probabilistic 
assessments about its impact which in turn depends upon its interaction 
with other rules of law and their application to factual situations. Yet, by 
defini!ion, although the legal element in this projected scenario will 
remain fixed, the nonlegal elements will be continually changing. In 
such volatile circumstances, it will be extremely difficult to arrive at 
any just compromise of conflicting interests, however temporary or 
makeshift. The task of striking a just compromise effective over time will 
be practically and theoretically impossible. Further, this unpredictable 
interplay of facts and values will not only inhibit the implementation of 
the original compromise, but will inadvertently bring into play a whole 
new group of generative forces which will support an entirely different 
and "unconsented to" compromise. This means that the judge "creates, 
through his decision of particular cases, the situation from which will 
emerge an as yet indeterminate constellation of legal forces."70 
In this way, judges contribute to the future enactments of Parliament. 
Their decisions will have a redistributive impact likely to be different to 
that intended by Parliament and these will influence the political 
struggle whose institutional venue is, of course, Parliament. This is 
exactly what has happened in the aftermath of the Bromley case. 
Although the decision favoured its position and policies, the 
Government has removed future doubt and successfully introduced a 
new Transport Act which imposes stringent controls on locally 
subsidised public transport.71 Consequently, as a contributor to 
legislative resources and a creator of the private interests which 
effectively constrain and dictate the legislative pronouncements of 
Parliament, judges cannot treat statutes "as an external objective factor 
 validating whatever [they] may choose to do."72 Judges are political 
actors and must justify their contribution to the legal process rather 
than rely on their activities being justified by it. As such, judges 
shoulder the heavy burden of choice.73 
 
B. The Social Visions of Judicial Review 
The law of judicial review is one doctrinal venue for the struggle over 
the terms and conditions of social life. Doctrinal principles are little 
more than historic plots on the legal graph which describes the 
contingent resolution of this dialectical tension between competing 
social visions. However, individual decisions are selective and amount to 
only fragmentary snatches of a more organic vision of social life. In any 
particular case, the outcome may be confused or uncertain and it will 
often be difficult to estimate which social vision has prevailed. In 
others, the decision may clearly represent the victory of one vision 
over another. Yet, over the long or medium haul, there will exist 
competing trends and conflicting themes. In the shifting sands of legal 
doctrine, pockets of stability appear but they are quickly disrupted by 
the swirling winds of litigation. Again, G.L.C.'s "Fares Fair" scheme 
offers a clear glimpse of this doctrinal indeterminacy. Few argue that 
Bromley was not a political decision.74 Moreover, it can be easily 
exposed as a blatant attem.gt to frustrate the socialist ambitions of an 
elected local authority. 5 
Although the House of Lords sought to balance the interests of 
ratepayers and transport users, its reliance on a purely formal analytic 
ignored their substantive inequalities. The House argued that, as they 
represented 40 per cent. of the electorate and provided the major 
source of G.L.C. rates revenue, the interests of ratepayers acted as a 
legitimate check on G.L.C. programmes. Moreover, as most of the 
transport users were not ratepayers, G.L.C. had failed to give sufficient 
prominence to the ratepayers' interests.76 On a head-counting basis, the 
House's conclusion seems sound and even defensible. Yet, the decision 
to attribute electors, ratepayers and transport users with equal formal 
status is a choice and not a given. It is part of the legal order and not 
the natural order of things. As over 60 per cent. of the rates are 
collected from commercial sources, the interests of corporate entities 
are given equal or greater weight than the electoral or travelling public. 
Accordingly, in the same way that G.L.C. made a choice to prefer 
transport users over commercial interests, Bromley represents a contrary 
preference. Indeed, as entry to the class of ratepayers is based 
exclusively on ownership of private property, the decision clearly 
favours the advantaged members of society over the less advantaged. 
In visionary terms, Bromley signifies a famous success for the support of 
individualism with its emphasis on free enterprise. For many, Bromley 
offers cogent evidence for the ideological bias of judicial review.77 Not 
 only does it undermine any lingering claims about judicial neutrality, but 
is brandished as incontrovertible proof of their reactionary politics. Yet, 
such rejoicing or mourning is premature. No sooner had the dust been 
kicked up, let alone settled, than along came another gust of 
litigation.78 Undeterred by its setback in Bromley, G.L.C. resolved to 
put into operation an alternative plan. It directed L.T.E. to reduce fares 
by 25 per cent.; the 17 per cent. increase in the deficit on L.T.E's 
revenue account was to be made good by a grant from G.L.C. 
Naturally, L.T.E. doubted the legality of this, so G.L.C. sought various 
declarations from the Divisional Court to validate its proposed scheme. 
While strenuously claiming to uphold and follow Bromley, the court 
held that the "new" scheme was lawful. This volte-face came as as much 
of a shock to G.L.C., albeit a pleasant one, as to the legal estblishment. 
The attempt to weave the two decisions, both explicitly based on a 
true construction of the 1969 Act,79 into the conceptual or ideological 
fabric will surely test the ingenuity and dexterity of the most gifted 
legal scholar or judge. 
The central thrust of the Divisional Court's judgment in Ex parte 
G.L.C. seems to be that, whereas, in Bromley, the G.L.C. had arbitrarily 
proceeded to put their election promise into effect, the alternative plan 
had been arrived at after an informed and considered balancing of the 
transport users' and ratepayers' interests. Although the 1969 Act can 
reasonably bear such an interpretation, the decision attaches an extremely 
generous meaning to Bromley. For most commentators, the ratio of 
Bromley is found in its "break-even" and "commercially viable" 
requirements. 80 Indeed, the Law Lords expressly refer to the actual 
policy decision and not just the process of decision-making as being 
unreasonable. In the light of such comparisons, the indeterminacy of 
legal doctrine seems manifest. If Bromley marks a success for 
individualism, Ex p. G.L.C. scores an equally famous victory for 
communitarianism or, at least, for the forces of anti-individualism. It 
seeks to promote the interests of the public at large over discrete 
segments of it. The dust of visionary conflict never settles. It is 
constantly blown around by the cross-currents of social struggle. 
An equally compelling illustration of the doctrinal indeterminacy of 
judicial review is Tameside,81 another politically high-profile decision. 
Satisfied that he was acting unreasonably, the Secretary of the State 
sought an order of mandamus to force implementation of a 
comprehensive school system, earlier approved by him, but later 
postponed by the local authority. The House of Lords held that his 
opinion of reasonableness was insufficient per se to justify intervention; 
there must be a sufficient factual basis for him to decide that no 
reasonable authority would postpone such plans. For many, the 
decision was another thinly disguised attempt to maintain the status 
 quo and frustrate ·efforts to introduce an educational system based on a 
more egalitarian model. Yet, less than a year later, the Court of Appeal 
reached an entirely contrary result. In Smith,82 the local authority sought 
to change the grammar schools into comprehensives. A group of parents 
at one grammar school sought to restrain the move. They obtained an 
interlocutory injunction from Megarry V.-C., but it was discharged on 
appeal. The local authority had not misused their power, which they 
exercised in an informed and considered way. In such matters, the court 
held that it was fitting that the interests of the whole community prevail 
over the views of a discrete group of individuals.83 Clearly, the two 
decisions pull in opposite directions; each tacitly sanctions a different 
scheme of social arrangements. Although each case involved a separate 
statutory provision,84 both cases were disposed of on the basis of the 
"reasonable" exercise of discretion. This standard is sufficiently broad 
to embrace a wide range of applications. Such a reconciliation of 
Tameside and Smith must concede the political nature of the judicial 
task. Also, the argument that the courts simply protected the prevailing 
political preferences, as expressed in the local democratic process, 
against private or governmental interference is extremely difficult to 
sustain in light of the views stated in Bromley on the marginal weight to 
be given to electoral preferences. 85 Indeed, the conflicting views over 
the impact of local elections on an authority's activities gives further 
support to the "indeterminacy thesis." 
Finally, one more illustration can be drawn from the field of 
immigration law. It remains a sad, but undeniable fact that, except in 
times of economic expansion, immigrants have not been the favoured 
children of the politico-economic establishment. It is startling, therefore, 
that at a time of economic recession and legislative tightening of 
immigration controls, the courts seem to be taking a strong stand against 
the State in favour of what many would consider to be the most 
undeserving of characters, the illegal immigrant. I say seem to be 
because the performance of the courts in a line of cases ending with 
Khawaja 86 evidences further the inherent indeterminacy of legal 
doctrine. The central question was the proper role of the courts when 
the State detains people as illegal entrants and intends to deport them. 
More specifically, is the courts' function to determine simply whether 
there was sufficient evidence on which immigration officers could 
reasonably reach their decisions or whether their decisions are actually 
justified on the evidence? In less than a decade, the courts have 
embraced all possible solutions. As Lord Bridge noted, this is "a matter 
of high constitutional principle affecting the liberty of the subject and 
the delineation of the respective functions of the executive and the 
judiciary." 
Beginning in· 1974 with Azam, 88 it was held that the courts should 
 review the factual basis on which a finding that a person is an "illegal 
entrant" is made and set it aside if it is not justified by the evidence. 
This amounts to a "recedent fact" theory of review. However, by 1978 
in Hussain, 8 the courts had moved to a "reasonable grounds" approach 
which favoured the State. This test was formally approved by the House 
of Lords in 1980 in Zamir.90 Yet, early in 1983, the Law Lords 
experienced a complete change of heart. In Khawaja, they held 
unanimously that the courts' function was to examine the actual 
evidence on which the immigration officer's finding was made. 
Stressing that the liberty of individuals was at stake and expressly 
departing from Zamir, the House decided that reasonableness was an 
inappropriate standard of review. Where executive authority is tied to 
the precedent establishment of a objective fact, the courts must 
determine whether the precedent requirement has been met. In Lord 
Scarman's words, "liberty is at stake: that is . . . a grave matter. . . 
[and] the reviewing court will therefore require to be satisfied that the 
facts which are required for the justification of the restraint put upon 
liberty do exist."91 
This line of immigration cases underlines most of the major points 
made in this section. First, not only is the rhetoric of judicial review 
removed from its actual practice, the rhetoric itself is often inconsistent 
and contradictory. Far from fulfilling a limited policing function, the 
courts have assumed the responsibility, as Lord Wilberforce puts it, "to 
see whether [the finding] was properly reached, not only as a matter of 
procedure, but also in substance and in law."92 Secondly, in performing 
that substantive inquiry, the courts do not consistently favour the 
interests of the dominant groups in society. Although taking a pro-
individualistic position, the protection of illegal immigrants is not 
usually considered to be supportive of a conservative ideology. Thirdly, 
judicial indecision of the judges subverts the claim that there is a 
coherent conceptual pattern imprinted on the judicial fabric. The only 
perceivable "pattern" is the constant oscillation between competing 
social visions, albeit fragmentedly portrayed and vaguely grasped. The 
indeterminacy is natural and inevitable, representing an irrepressible 
dimension of the political condition. Judges and scholars cannot avoid 
being institutional brokers for competing social ideals. But they do 
deserve to be castigated for their efforts to deny the contingent 
character of social arrangements, to wrap this basic truth in a pseudo-
scientific cloak of mystification and to pretend that the present 
organisation of society is rational, necessary and just. Their sustained 
efforts "make a particular scheme of the possible and desirable forms 
of human association stand in place of the indefinite possibilities of 
human connection."93 
 
 C. The Judicial Ouster of Privative Clauses 
The rationale for judicial review is said to be the constitutional and 
democratic need to regulate and resist the monopolisation and 
arbitrariness of State power. Yet there is discernible within the cases a 
less subtle and commendable sub-plot. In checking bureaucratic power, 
the courts have extended their own constitutional power. This self-
aggrandising tendency is revealed in their handling of "ouster" or 
"privative clauses." According to judicial rhetoric, the courts are the 
willing servants of the legislative master.94 With Tennyson's Light 
Brigade, the judiciary proudly proclaim that "ours is not to reason 
why, ours is but to do and die." Consequently, provided it expresses 
itself clearly, the legislature is reasonably entitled to expect that the 
judges will respect its wish to have them stay out of the administrative 
turf. Indeed, they have launched a counter-offensive. The privative 
clause is to legislative-judicial relations 
"what the Maginot Line was to military tactics: a virtually impregnable 
legislative proiect of defence, designed to protect the [administrative 
processj from frontal assault. And now it has suffered the same fate. It 
has been outflanked by a judicial panzer attack, a virtual constitutional 
blitzkrieg. "95 
As a general observation, the courts have construed preclusive provisions 
so as to limit, rather than debar, judicial involvement in the control of 
administrative action. While feigning deference to legislative intent, 
the courts' power to review on jurisdictional grounds remains intact in 
spite of repeated legislative protestations and no matter how sweeping or 
encyclopaedic the clause. It is characterised as "a straightforward 
problem of statutory interpretation. "96 In the acclaimed decision of 
Anisminic, 97 the House of Lords held that a statutory provision that "the 
determination by the [Foreign Compensation] commission of any 
application made to them . . . shall not be called in question in any court 
of law" did not oust the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts. The 
courts have managed to achieve such "straightforward" interpretations 
by the familiar device of interpretative presumptions. The basic force of 
this position is that any error of law puts the tribunal outside its 
jurisdiction and places it within the supervisory jurisdiction of the 
courts. Although Lord Diplock concedes that Parliament can deprive 
the courts of all power, the present judicial disposition to privative 
clauses makes that merely a theoretical rather than a practical 
possibility. 98 
This disingenuousness undermines the whole social compact 
which the courts claim to uphold and enforce. By adhering to a 
linguistic approach to statutory interpretation and hedging it with 
defensive presumptions, the courts manage to constrain and dictate the 
terms of Parliament's legislative competence. They impose a 
constitutional and linguistic straight-jacket on the legislature. The 
 message from the judges to the legislators rings loud and clear"Use a 
particular verbal formula if you want us to even consider 
implementing your decisions. Even then, nothing is guaranteed. 
Otherwise, you run the risk of having a different set of legal 
consequences occur than you bargained for." Accordingly, the 
general approach to statutory interpretation, especially when applied 
to privative clauses, severely confines and often subverts the wishes 
of Parliament. The rhetoric may be of constitutional partners, but the 
reality is of constitutional competitors. While pretending to be a 
bulwark against the usurpation of political power, the judicial 
process usurps the legislative function. The ghost of Lord Coke is 
alive and well; it stalks the corridors of legislative power. 
 
D. The Marginality of Judicial Review 
As a necessary corollary of assuming the management of the nation's 
business, the State has established a pervasive network of administrative 
agencies to carry out its decisions and plans. Indeed, a major reason for 
the creation of such a bureaucratic enterprise was dissatisfaction with 
the courts' performance. 99 There were doubts about their capacity 
and willingness to handle effectively the problems of collective 
consumption, especially when their traditional forte and preference 
was for the protection of individual rights. 1 Also, the selective, but 
systematic attempt to withdraw vast areas of administrative 
competence from the judges through the enactment of privative 
clauses is indicative of this trend. Moreover, a crude analysis and 
comparison of judicial and administrative statistics provides ample 
support for the marginal operation of judicial review. 
Apart from other administrative bodies, there are about 2,000 separate 
tribunals. Calculating very conservatively, there are over a million 
administrative decisions made annually. However, only a minute fraction of 
those decisions is reviewed by the courts. Although there has been an 
increase in applications for judicial review, the ratio of applications for 
judicial review of administrative decisions remains insignificant. Further, no 
more than 25 per cent. of the handful of applications are successful.2 Also, a 
successful application only means that a decision will be set aside or 
quashed; it does not guarantee a favourable decision the second time around. 
A litigant may win the legal battle, but lose the administrative war. 
Nevertheless, while the resort to judicial review is a remote possibility, the 
spectre of judicial intervention might have an exhortatory and intimidating 
effect. Mindful of its possible invocation, the administrative process will 
remedy its practices to conform to the doctrinal dictates of judicial review. 
Such an argument places great and unjustified faith in the "inspirational" 
impact of law. 
Little work has been done on the social consequences of law. Modern 
orthodoxy assumes the instrumental effect of legal precepts and decisions. 
The small amount of empirical work carried out indicates that the social 
 impact of law has been vastly overestimated by lawyers.3 Any impact can be 
more accurately attributed to legislative and regulatory intervention rather 
than judicial activity.4 For instance, in America, judicial attempts to curb 
and control the conduct of the police failed to improve its practices and, in 
some instances, actually encouraged police perjury. 5 At best, the direct effect 
of legal rules on public officials is problematic. Furthermore, lawyers often 
assume that the impact will result in the intended conforming behaviour. 
Initial research suggests that the impact of law is as likely to be indirect 
and unintended as direct and intended.6 The indeterminacy of the courts' 
educational effect results from the fact that "the meaning of judicial signals 
is dependent on the information, experience, skill and resources that 
disputants bring to them."7 As the reported transmissions of the courts are 
minimal, the administrative audience will only be partially informed, even if 
they are tuned in to the judicial wavelength. In fact, the Canadian 
experience is that the corrective and inhibiting influences of judicial 
decisions ought not be to taken for granted at all.8 Finance is a more 
effective and important tool of control than adjudication. 
There will, of course, be the landmark cases, such as Bromley and 
Tameside, which loom large in the public consciousness. Although these are 
of symbolic value, their importance must not be underrated. The widespread 
attention devoted to such celebrated instances underlines the potent and 
subtle "educative" force of the law. As Douglas Hay has so pertinently 
observed, "ideologies do not rest on realities, however, but on appearances."9 
Bromley and Tameside have not improved the lot of the sickly in National 
Health Service hospitals, the homeless on the council housing waiting list, 
the destitute at the Supplementary Benefit offices or the consumer of public 
utilities. 10 Such landmark cases are simply isolated instances presented as 
evidence of the courts' continuing and pivotal involvement in the control of 
the administration. These infrequent outbursts should not be mistaken for a 
continuing and productive dialogue. Indeed, even the immediate effect of 
Bromley was minimal; the G.L.C. achieved its general object of reduced fares. 
In the immigration field, John Evans has conceded that, although it is not "a 
complete irrelevance," judicial review has little effect on the administrative 
process; initial dispositions survive procedural correction, subsequent rule 
changes nullify judicial intervention, no effective modification of impugned 
administrative behaviour occurs and there is continued ignorance by political 
applicants of legal rights.11 Accordingly, judicial review is of marginal 
"quantitative" significance. 
 
III. THE "RAG TRADE" OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAw SCHOLARSHIP 
 
A. The Conceptual Clothiers 
In the wake of the revived judicial interest in the administrative process, the 
academic community has greeted enthusiastically the refreshed sources of raw 
judicial material. Sadly, but predictably, most legal scholars have acted with 
intellectual deference; they have been happy to follow rather than lead the 
judges. As such, they have made no real contribution to the debate over the 
pressing problems of the administrative process. With good cause, the 
performance and record of most administrative scholars have been assessed as 
 "dismal."12 They have deliberately set their sights low. Conceiving of their 
role as being "to expound the black-letter rules of law in such a way as to 
reveal coherence, "13 they seem to relish their self-appointed role as bespoke 
tailors to the Emperor. Using the available judicial data, they have spun a 
whole invisible wardrobe of co-ordinated and voguish garments. In the 
process, they have convinced themselves that the clothes are real and that 
the Emperor is not naked. This craftsmanship has been given the 
jurisprudential seal of approval by the master couturier, Ronald Dworkin. He 
is adamant that "the judge must show the facts of history in the best light he 
can, and this means that he must not show that history as unprincipled 
chaos."14 
In the search for coherence, there have evolved two main camps, the 
"conceptualists" and the "ideologists." The former is by far the most 
populous, but there are important divisions among their ranks. The 
conceptualists are united in their attempt to construct and defend a corpus of 
doctrinal principles, which coalesce to form an effective, fair and objective 
restraint on State action. This doctrine is claimed to be non-political in 
origin and objective. At one extreme is a "classical group," headed by H. W. 
R. Wade 15 and J. F. Garner. 16 Both fit judicial review into a very simple 
constitutional design. Parliament delegates power to administrative bodies 
which are accountable both legally and politically. While substantive policies 
and merits of any decision are political issues, the courts ensure that 
delegated power is not abused or misused. However, this does not 
mean a complete subservience to the legislative will. The courts' 
constitutional responsibility is to provide "adequate safeguards for the 
reasonable interests of the individual."17 For both writers, parliamentary 
sovereignty is a guiding principle of the English constitution. Another 
principle is adherence to the Rule of Law.18 As Wade observes, the 
judges have sought to "preserve a deeper constitutional logic than that 
of mere literal obedience to Parliament."19 The Rule of Law operates as 
a bulwark against the powerful engines of State running amok.20 
Moreover, Wade insists that the existing doctrine of judicial review is 
devoid of political content or colouring; it represents a neutral and 
necessary protection of the individual against the abuse of State 
power.21 The fact that the revival of judicial activity coincides with the 
growth of the modern regulatory state is presumably both appropriate 
and necessary. 
A more enlightened form of "conceptualist" scholarship has arisen 
recently. Although de Smith rejects the simplistic "classical" approach 
and concedes that judicial review is "inevitably sporadic and peripheral, 
"22 he has little constructive to offer in its place. At bottom, he suggests 
that the courts must maintain standards of formal legality and leave 
substantive control to political forums.23 Whereas Wade and Garner 
experience no doubts over the appropriateness of such foundational 
premises, de Smith endures some crisis of confidence. Yet he seems 
insufficiently disturbed to reject such premises entirely. He even goes so 
 far as to argue that "the degree of unity in the principles traceable in the 
law of judicial review has been underestimated. "24 For de Smith, the 
need to maintain legitimacy is prior to the need to develop a more 
sophisticated, less constrained response to the administrative regime of the 
collectivist state. Similarly, John Evans, while recognising that "judges 
tend institutionally to conservatism," maintains that "it is the 
constitutional duty of the courts to give effect to the plain meaning of 
legislative enactments even though this may result in great hardship or 
injustice to individuals. "25 Despite their troubled consciences, de Smith 
and Evans defer to what they view as the inevitable. Their progressive 
sympathies are stifled by their adherence to the traditional ideology 
which conceives of Parliament as the true source of democratic 
expression and which the courts must blindly respect. 
Such scholarly endeavours fail on two clear counts; they do not provide a 
convincing account of existing judicial practice nor do they offer a satisfactory 
plan for future judicial activity. There is ample evidence within the case law 
to demonstrate judicial interference with the substantive aspects of 
administrative decisions. Indeed, the possibility of performing a purely 
formal policing function is remote and suspect.26 Secondly, as a strategy for 
reform, the "classical" theory is not only ideologically partisan, but fails to 
preserve its thinly disguised political preferences. In so far as it advocates the 
application of the common law rules of private law,27 it sanctions the courts' 
application of the conservative brake of the common law to the more liberal 
accelerator of legislation. Whereas modern legislation tends to be regulatory 
and partially communitarian, the common law remains largely individualistic 
and pathological. 28 Its commitment to individual autonomy in today's urban 
and technological world is misplaced. 
As such, the "classical" approach stymies the potential, but 
restricted, impact of legislation; "the corollary of this judicial 
deregulation is a vision of laissez-faire individualism as the 
embodiment of a 'natural order' . . . that protects individuals from the 
pervasiveness, inexplicability and uncertainty of regulatory law."29 
Notwithstanding its commitment to and dependence on a minimal state, 
the "classical" weapons are plainly inadequate for the task and a truly 
"classical" model of judicial review may actually facilitate the spread 
of the bureaucratic state. While the emphasis upon process and form 
may result in the protection of individual interests in the occasional 
dispute, individual interests cannot be effectively protected without 
resort to substantive precepts. Moreover, the historical facts tell a very 
different tale. During the supposed revival of administrative law, the 
administrative process has gone from strength to strength. On the macro-
level, the impact of judicial review is difficult to detect.30 On the 
microlevel, mindful that judicial dealings with the administrative 
process are pathological, the increased number of applications for 
judicial review by individuals indicates that all is not what it is made 
out to be. 
 Recently, a "neo-classical" approach has begun to gain attention. 
Recognising the simplism of the earlier work, it still maintains that it is 
feasible to construct an adequate model of judicial review without the 
courts being thrown into the political maelstrom of policy-making. For 
instance, D. J. Galligan suggests that this can be achieved by courts 
demanding that administrators meet the standards of rational decision-
making; "a condition of the legitimacy and justifiability of the exercise of 
any government power is that decisions be rational and that the power-
holder be able to give reasons which both explain and seek to justify its 
exercise."31 Each administrative decision must be capable of being 
located within a wider complex of goals and policies. Paul Craig 
supports those standards.32 Further, although he advocates substantive 
intervention, he explicitly opts out of the search "to find an overarching 
principle to guide us."33 Yet, it is not easy to identify or be convinced of 
the causal link between increased formal rationality and substantive 
justice. Indeed, it may simply serve to legitimate maladministration. The 
breadth of the gap that can exist between reasons and action is 
exemplified by the judicial pronouncements and performance in 
administrative law. 
 
B. The Ideological Tailors 
While the "ideologists" are also engaged in the search for coherence, 
they ins;st that the law is in a state of conceptual disarray. The 
suggestion that there is a subtle, yet meaningful conceptual unity to 
the case law that meets the dictates of constitutional democracy is 
dismissed as nothing more than an academic's pipe-dream. Beneath the 
conceptual chaos, they claim to have unearthed a disturbing ideological 
coherence. The precise contom:s of that ideology remain a matter of 
dispute. For instance, J. A. G. Griffiths maintains that the Rule of Law 
is only another mask for the rule of "conventional, established and 
settled interests."34 Far from being a "neutral arbitral force,"35 the judges 
are concerned to protect and preserve the existing order. With greater 
sophistication, Patrick McAuslan detects a similar ideological 
underpinning. Concentrating on planning law, he argues that the law 
is devoted to maintaining the existing socio-economic order and to 
frustrating the redistributive potential of law. In spite of appearances 
to the contrary, administrative law is a tool "to maintain . . . the 
existing state of property relations in society,"36 and evidences "a 
predisposition towards individualism. "37 
Like the conceptualists, the ideologists are guilty of reductionism. 
While the basic thrust of their arguments is not contested, they 
ignore and understate the subtle operation of legal doctrine. Although 
both writers concede that the idea of the Rule of Law is not wholly 
illusory, they appear to have no systemic, but only an ad hoc, 
explanation for cases like Smith and Khawaja. Yet the frequency and 
 weight of such instances undermine their claim of coherence. The 
judicial enterprise gravitates between competing ideologies. Apart from 
ignoring the decisional facts, it is difficult to appreciate why any 
particular mode of politico-economic organisation requires any given 
set of rules. Indeed, such a view assumes that law has a direct 
instrumental effect. The "capitalistic system of society" has weathered 
the storm of collectivist legislation, welfare statism and industrial 
nationalisation. It has adapted itself and, arguably, emerged stronger. In 
the face of such resilience, it is difficult to accept that the "existing 
order" demands a certain regime of judicial decisions to guarantee its 
continued survival. Moreover, even if the whole judicial process was 
willingly committed to the perpetuation of "capitalism," it is often 
difficult to know why one particular rule in one particular situation is 
necessarily demanded. Within the judicial process all is not 
ideologically black or white; the shades of grey are rampant. 
At bottom, English legal scholarship is atheoretical. Like the 
English philosophical tradition, legal academics tend to be pragmatic and 
functional. They are extremely suspicious of attempts at grand theorising, 
38 instinctively inclining toward the practical rather than the 
philosophical. Although this lends an air of relevance and direction to 
their work, it inhibits the development of long-term proposals. 
Suggestions for reform tend to be piecemeal and incremental. Yet, for 
there to be real change there must be a theory of change. For all his 
critical energy, Professor Griffith has little to offer by way of 
improvement. He seems content to despair and depose to the inevitable 
continuance of the judicial and political status quo. Indeed, he seems to 
believe that the conscious development of a set of general ground rules 
by parliamentarians and improved draftinJt9 will "introduce order and 
principle into this part of the law." McAuslan's position is less obvious. 
While he advocates a genuine move toward greater public participation in 
plannin§ law,41 he also seems to envisage a residual , role for the 
courts.4 
 
IV. THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY 
Legal scholars must redirect their considerable energies and imagination.43 
No matter how efficient the judicial process becomes, it is a marginal 
activity. To concentrate so much time and attention on the courts is to 
reinforce the mistaken belief that the courts lie at the heart of the legal 
and political process.44 Such misdirected activity diverts necessary talents 
away from the critical scrutiny and improvement of other modes of 
bureaucratic control.45 Moreover, the academic preoccupation with 
judicial review insulates and shields the real sources of bureaucratic 
maladministration from sustained exposure and eradication. A 
combination of theory and action is demanded. The first step is 
criticism of existing arrangements; this is a valuable source of 
 enlightenment and liberation in itself. As Unger warns, "until the central 
problem . . . of domination is resolved, the search for community is 
condemned to be idolatrous, or utopian, or both at once."46 However, it 
is ill-advised to rush into constructing grand plans for the "good 
society." No matter how well-intentioned, the replacement of one form 
of domination by another must be studiously avoided. As much as 
individuals are the victim, so they must become the liberators.47 The 
challenge is to suggest tangible and viable programmes through which 
society can rid itself of domination and begin to glimpse the way things 
might be. 
An obvious candidate for study is "participatory democracy." 
Judicial review operates as a pale and perverse substitute for genuine 
and vigorous popular involvement and control. Indeed, the need for 
judicial review is premised on the failure of the institutional structure 
of British democracy to ensure meaningful citizen participation in 
government. At present, power is shuffled around among elite interest 
groups and the State is captive to private interests.48 The forums of 
popular choice-legislature and market-are deadlocked. Popular 
participation is reduced to the formal and sporadic ritual by which social 
arrangements are justified as the product of citizen choice rather than the 
imposition of elite preference.  There must be "a revolution in democratic 
consciousness. "49 A radical and substantive vision of a democratic 
society has to be imagined and pursued. Democracy must become a 
way of daily life and embrace the exercise of all social power, public 
or private: "The idea of democracy is the cutting edge of the radical 
critique, the best inspiration for change toward a more humane world, 
the revolutionary idea of our time."50 
Such a project might best be able to respect the imperatives of 
historical contingency and social contradiction without becoming 
enslaved to them. Normative discourse and political conversation would 
be entrenched and the agenda of political debate and action would be 
constantly revised. Far from having an ambition of utopian harmony, 
a robust democracy would rely on disagreement and conflict as its 
motive force. Legal scholars must turn their attention and energies 
toward these challenging, but exciting possibilities. The tragic irony of 
the present practice and doctrine of judicial review is its defence in the 
name of democracy. 51 The. reality is that that legal institution has 
helped to stymie the participatory initiative and dull the democratic 
imagination. Legal scholars must commit themselves to arresting and 
reversing this trend; "self-determination begins at home."52  · 
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON* 
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